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Peace and Nuclear-free Advocacy Revisited:
Lessons from New Zealand and Implications for
Japan
Dr. Pinar Temocin and Prof. Noriyuki Kawano
Hiroshima University

Abstract
Although there are multiple pathways of conditions leading to desired policy outcomes, the viability of
peace and nuclear-free advocacy can be related to the convergence of a strong, diverse, and active civil
society, where leadership and a responsive political environment are well-integrated. We discuss that
sociopolitical mobilizations (e.g. peace and nuclear-free advocacy), active civil society, and democratic
institutions are not only linked to each other but are also co-existent. In this essay, we look at the case of
New Zealand (Aotearoa) with its unique nuclear-free peace movement and find some implications for
contemporary Japan, which is the only country which was subjected to atomic bombing but which does
not support nuclear disarmament in its official policies, despite the presence of a long-standing peace
movement and substantial majorities in favor of steps like Japan signing the 2017 Treaty on the
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW).
Keywords: nuclear, peace, advocacy, New Zealand, Japan, TPNW

I.

Introduction

Since the 1980s, New Zealand has played a successful role in the global nuclear debate by achieving a
nuclear-free policy goal. When considering the bigger picture, the claim could be made that New
Zealand’s political and social movements in the contemporary era were influenced by several major
events and incidents including the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, New Zealand’s
involvement in the Korean War and, later, the Vietnam War, their security agreement with the U.S.
(called ANZUS), the continuation of French nuclear testing in the Pacific, the visits of U.S. nuclearcapable warships, the bombing of the Greenpeace ship (The Rainbow Warrior) by the French foreign
intelligence service The General Directorate for External Security (DGSE), and others. These events
contributed to the sociopolitical mobilization throughout the country, which in turn led to a nuclear-free
status. In past research, we argued that civil society mobilization in New Zealand, with a strong anti-
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nuclear identity, produced important results, and there are two important driving factors behind the policy
achievement: persistent civil society favoring pacifism and inclusive democracy and governance [1].
In this essay, we argue that civil society and political parties aligned with sociopolitical mobilizations are
important elements to achieve the goals for a sociopolitical change. We also try to see what lessons from
New Zealand can be drawn for Japan, which is not willing to sign the Treaty on the Prohibition of
Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), despite the presence of a long-standing peace movement. Our aim is to fill
the gap existing between pro-nuclear disarmament advocacy carried out by civil society and the positions
adopted by pro-nuclear states.
Importantly, we want to emphasize that our intention is not to compare both countries, as we are aware of
cross-country and sociocultural differences and positionalities in international political life and defense
policies. Instead, we are interested in what lessons we can draw from New Zealand’s experience. Also,
we do not differentiate “mobilization” from “movement,” even though we assert that movements provide
a much more comprehensive understanding in terms of approaches and strategies of actors involved. In a
similar vein, “effectiveness” in this essay is used interchangeably with “success,” which is defined as
achieving the desired policy outcome of sociopolitical mobilizations.
In social movement literature, the scholars who researched “resource mobilization” discuss how resources
(material, human, social-organizational, cultural, and moral ones) are significant elements for the surge
and rise of any mobilization affecting the achievement of desired outcomes [2–7]. Also, the proponents of
the “political opportunities” theory considered social movements as a window of opportunity providing
encouragement while carrying out their activities during the mobilization [8–13].
The case of New Zealand has proven that the sole explanation of resource analysis would not be sufficient
to understand any desired policy achievements led by civic actors. The bottom-up engagement of civil
society and the democratic and open nature of the state leading the peace and nuclear-free mobilization to
become a “nuclear-free zone” are equally important. In other words, thanks to the domestic sociopolitical
structure, the movement members can have an opportunity to focus on a contested issue, take an action
accordingly (such as creating social pressure), and ally with supportive parties [14]. Therefore, this essay
considers not only to the dynamics of civil society masterminding the mobilization but also the openness
of the state to communicating and partnering with the civil society actors.

II.

The Case of New Zealand

Despite the early nuclear-science-centered enthusiasm following the Manhattan Project, New Zealand
created an initial nuclear-free ethos due to several incidents that led many ordinary citizens to unify over
the course of time. The U.S. bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 was a crucial event for the
initial stage of unification and mobilization in New Zealand as it sparked empathy and solidarity, as well
as outrage. As a result of this, as well as the Korean and Vietnam Wars, a small, nuclear-free peace
movement with a largely moral approach developed in New Zealand between the 1960s and 1980s. This
then evolved to a widespread and powerful force in domestic politics focused on practical questions, such
as French nuclear testing in the Pacific in the 1960s, and later, the visits of American nuclear-armed and
nuclear-powered U.S. ships. One of the strongest arguments for peace and nuclear-free mobilization was
independence from the ANZUS treaty, which was based on the shared security interests since the 1950s
[15]. According to the Treaty, U.S. ships and aircraft had a right to enter New Zealand’s territory because
the U.S. is one of the members of the ANZUS. The treaty was not welcomed by New Zealanders, who
wanted to be autonomous with no ties to the U.S. [16].
The diverse elements of peace and nuclear-free advocacy in New Zealand between the 1960s and 1980s
were based on the implementation and continuation of mass demonstrations, rallying, campaigns,
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petitions, press statements, lobbying, educational tools, and expert involvement, among other things.
These became mainstream tactics in a non-violent manner and were organized by the heterogeneous
groups, associations, committees, and individual participants. Some of the active groups included the
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament New Zealand, the Women’s International League for Peace and
Freedom, Peace Squadron, Greenpeace, The Peace Media, New Zealand Nuclear Free Peacemakers,
Peace Council, Quakers, Peace Movement Aotearoa, the Disarmament and Security Centre, Women for
Peace, Maori Women’s Welfare League, and Progressive Youth Movement [14].
Although there were several challenges during these mobilizations, such as France`s continuous nuclear
testing in the Pacific in the 1960s and the visits of U.S. ships, the political goal was clearly defined and
prioritized by civil society. The actions toward nuclear tensions were formulated, solidified, disseminated,
justified, and backed in both a collective and decentralized manner by heterogenous civic actors including
pacifist grassroots groups, the Māori, scientists, intellectuals, students, churches, environmentalists, and
others1. Women played prominent leadership roles in disarmament activities via committee creation,
petition preparation, and network contact activity required for effective campaigning [17]. While
mobilizing between the 1960s and 1980s, New Zealanders voluntarily created specific campaigns, lobbied
the members of parliament to declare the Nuclear Free Zones Campaign, used media toolkits and
channels intending to convey unity in diversity, and invited authoritative overseas experts [18].
These events and incidents created a nationwide counter-nuclear stance in which overwhelming public
opinion and the Labor Party worked together on a sole and unconditional mission: the creation of a
nuclear-free zone. When the majority of people were persistent on nuclear issues, the Labor Party
benefited from it and campaigned against nuclear weapons in collaboration with civil society. The Labor
Party was not only sensitive to public preferences but also responsive to mass mobilization. The Labor
Party was strategic, putting the nuclear issue at the center of their party agenda in their electoral politics.
Upon the Labor Party’s victory in the 1984 snap election, the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone,
Disarmament, and Arms Control Act was successfully passed [19]. Following the nuclear-free law, the
U.S. suspended New Zealand from the ANZUS security agreement, which led the country to become
more independent in its foreign policy [16].
Consequently, in the late 1980s, Japan, as a U.S. ally, distanced itself from New Zealand's nuclear-free
approach and policies and had excluded New Zealand representatives in Tokyo from strategic and
security discussions related to the Pacific [20]. Additionally, New Zealand’s legislative decision led New
Zealand and Japan to limit prime ministerial visits in the 1980s and 1990s [21].
What makes New Zealand unique from its counterparts in history is the creation and maintenance of the
peaceful and nuclear-free identity as a symbol of New Zealand’s values. Since the 1980s, New Zealanders
have been proud of their recent history and national identity that is based on a nuclear-free consensus in
nuclear policy-making. Successive governments from various parts of the political spectrum have
maintained their support for these policies, ensuring they have endured since then [22]. Not only at home,
but also globally, the nation has continuously contributed and committed to the realization of a world free
of nuclear weapons. The peace and nuclear-free advocacy and activities by their civil society actors have
never stopped, as we see in their promotion of the TPNW, while the New Zealand government has
asserted an official leadership role in support of the treaty. Non-governmental experts and advocates
1

For example, the members of the well-known campaign, Peace Squadron, confronted and blockaded the visiting
nuclear warship. They presented radical acts of protest such as civil disobedience. They also produced media
attention and generated public interest with a focus on stopping nuclear ship visits. Another well-known example is
the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament New Zealand. The members reached the government by fax, open letters,
and petitions, and were involved in extensive lobbying with the New Zealand government while sustaining
organizational activities by donations [14].
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played a leading role in the treaty negotiations through providing working papers, interventions, and
international petitions and letters. The country is also actively following up the implementation process of
the treaty [23].

III. The Case of Japan
Many people in Hiroshima and Nagasaki have been active in mobilizations for peace since the tragic
events of 1945. In the past decades, they have striven for a non-nuclearized future as well as disarmament
with a powerful message: “No more Hiroshimas.” In particular, atomic bomb survivors (hibakusha) were
mobilized by several means, including (but not limited to) campaigning against nuclear weapons,
petitioning for their abolishment, collecting millions of signatures, holding international conferences on
the anniversaries of the bombings, sharing victims’ experiences continuously, creating an avenue for
peaceful dialogue, using the artistic expressions of their demand, disseminating information about the
dangers of nuclear weaponry through media outlets, etc. They have created a powerful “ban-the-bomb”
movement (a peace and nuclear-free movement), for which they have received significant attention in and
outside of Japan. Organizational drivers of this mobilization emerged and have grown over time,
including the Japan Council against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (Gensuikyou), Nihon Hidankyo (a
national organization of atomic bomb survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki), and Mayors for Peace. This
active and vocal mobilization has not convinced the Japanese government to be independent in its
nuclear-weapons-related decisions [24].
Japan has been a member of the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) since 1976 and does not have its own
nuclear weapons. However, official foreign policy is based on adherence to nuclear deterrence. Japan was
absent from the TPNW, which aims to eliminate nuclear weapons through a legally-binding international
agreement and delegitimizes nuclear deterrence2. According to the International Campaign to Abolish
Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), the nuclear-weapon states and all nuclear umbrella states, including NATO
members and U.S. allies, did not participate in the negotiations in 2017, except the Netherlands, which is
the only state to vote against the adoption of the TPNW [26]. The question then arises: why has Japan
taken a neutral stance toward the Treaty after suffering massively from radiation following the 1945
atomic bombs? Since post-war Japan bases its own non-nuclear weapons policy on the 1967 Three NonNuclear Principles (Hikaku San Gensoku), requiring the non-possession, non-production, and nonintroduction of any nuclear weapons, why is there such reluctance to play a leading role in the global
nuclear debate, especially after experiencing the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons as well
as the mobilization of peace and nuclear-free advocates?
We assert that there are several factors for Japan’s passive role, unwillingness to participate in the
negotiations, and refusal to be a signatory of the TPNW, notwithstanding the domestic commitment to
pacifism. First, it is related to the longstanding and ongoing security alliance and defense cooperation
with the U.S., as well as U.S. pressure (Japan abstains as nuclear arms ban treaty talks signed at UN
2017). It is in fact rooted in the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security (ANPO), which is based
on the commitment of the two nations to defend each other. Second, it is related to the threats and
missiles from nuclear-armed North Korea (and also North Korea’s nuclear weapon development efforts).
Japan’s geopolitical position (surrounded by North Korea, China, and Russia) makes Japan dependent
upon the U.S. vis-à-vis a nuclearized Northeast Asia [27]. Japan has always been caught between the
reality of nuclear threat and the hopes of civil society.

For this, the Japanese Ambassador to the UN Conference on Disarmament stated that “Regrettably, given the
present circumstances, we must say that it would be difficult for Japan to participate in this Conference in a
constructive manner and in good faith, believing that the NK threats and provocative actions would not be resolved
through a nuclear ban treaty” [25].
2
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The sub-factors are basically sociohistorical. Japan has an advanced democracy with a vibrant culture of
community-based grassroots civil society mobilization (shimin undou) established in the 1960s and 1970s
due to environmental degradation, which accompanied the country’s rapid industrialization, and its effects
on the lives of the people [28]. Additionally, labor union protests in the 1950s, ANPO demonstrations for
the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, 1968–1969 Japanese university protests by the New Left student
organizations, and middle-class women’s movements were significant elements in expanding a stratum of
socio-politically interested and active citizens. This is also similar in the case of nuclear energy-related
mobilization. The actors in the nuclear energy-free mobilization before the 2011 Fukushima accident have
three social layers: residents in areas designated for nuclear power plant construction (particularly farmers
and fishers); students, workers, and middle class housewives based in the cities mobilizing following the
1986 Chernobyl nuclear accident due to the imported food being contaminated with radioactive materials
and concerns about the risks to their infants; and the urban intellectuals promoting renewable energy
alternatives [29].
However, the impact of citizens’ involvement did not create nationwide mobilization and remained local
because sociopolitical issues on the national level were dominated by industrial interests [30]. Civil
society groups and organizations were typically small with limited budgets, membership, and professional
staff, and with small geographic scopes because of centralized policy structure, strong bureaucratical
government, and strict regulations, accompanied by lack of recognition and funding [31].
Community members in rural areas were financially supported by the pro-nuclear Liberal Democratic
Party (LDP). Organized labor unions became discouraged in fighting against contested issues. Young
people also became uninterested in politics over time as they sought to secure stable jobs in companies.
“Citizenship” education for the younger generation was not (and still is not) prevalent. Mass media has
also controlled the voices of civil society actors on sociopolitical issues and made the populace invisible
[29]. Additionally, Japanese people value peace, calm, and harmony and avoid direct conflict with
political authorities in any circumstances. These factors resulted in a decline in the political participation
of the Japanese citizens, leading to less interest and fewer commitments from the 1970s to 1990s [30]. In
the past few decades, the situation has remained similar. Surprisingly, following the 2011 Fukushima
nuclear power plant accident, LDP received an electoral victory in 2012, an election which saw the lowest
voter turnout (59%) in post-war Japanese history [32].
In addition, the "carrot and stick” approach (ame to muchi) that is based on reward and punishment by
Japanese governmental representatives and policy elites (seifu daihyousha) does not provide the public
with sufficient freedom to discuss sociopolitical issues openly. And, this policy approach leads to a
perpetual control system. Due to the hierarchical structure in almost every sphere of society (from microto macro-policy-making), the established institutions are very strong where insulated and centralized
policy-making is taking place. It does not allow the Japanese to reflect and engage critically in
sociopolitical issues. These mobilizations remained somewhat elusive due to the increasing power of
Japan’s conservative and legislatively-dominant political party, with its “friendly authoritarianism” [33].
Taken all together, citizens of Japan became less participative in politics and more pessimistic about
democratic freedom, with low expectations and trust in government as well as traditional political
institutions [34]. The nuclear-free struggle of peace activists and A-bomb victims against nuclear
orthodoxy has been isolated and remains local, solely based in the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki,
except in their collaboration with their international counterparts over the decades. This isolation (kakuri)
also never allows the peace and nuclear-free political parties to form a nationwide powerful coalition.
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IV. Civil Society on Contested Issues
As a general term, “civil society” is considered an organized sociopolitical life that is independent from
the state. It is based on volunteering and the self-generation, and largely self-supporting of groups [35]. It
includes non-governmental bodies and organizations that political scientists consider interest or advocacy
groups. The concept of “civil society” is highly dependent on the characteristics of each society;
therefore, each society can redefine it differently, depending upon the particular issue that concerns them.
Civil society participants take action mainly on a particular, contested issue that concerns the broader part
of the society. Issue-oriented civil society actors consider a single concern or essential problem that
affects them on a larger scale and try to bring about societal change. This issue can be peace or antinuclear oriented, depending upon what concerns the larger part of the society. By pointing to a specific
issue, they can reduce the challenges of contestation by signaling their solidarity, providing logistical
assistance, mobilizing experts, guiding, and pressuring their opponents to tackle the issue. In social
mobilization, the typical form of conventional action is based on making their voices heard and getting
their demands met. With their experience and expertise, civil society actors can also be helpful in
identifying sociopolitical issues and creating a window of opportunity for sociopolitical advocacy. They
can also help victims identify the issue and capture public and political attention through a common
interest and goal [36].
The concept of civil society mobilizing for sociopolitical contested issues (a.k.a. social movements) has
been largely discussed in literature since the 1960s. Social movement is defined by Della Porta and Diani
as a “distinct social process, consisting of the mechanisms through which actors are engaged in collective
action” [37]. According to them, people, or mobilized actors, are involved in social movements for many
issues including nuclear nonproliferation, environmentalism, and more. They engage in social, political,
and/or cultural conflicts to promote or oppose certain forms of social change. They realize it through
motivated informal networks in pursuit of a common interest and goal and develop social identities
through advocacy channels [37].

V.

Discussion

As we are cognizant of the differences (timing, political and cultural status quo, diplomatic approaches,
etc.), we intend to see how New Zealand played a role in the nuclear issue in terms of prevention and
abolition of nuclear war following the Hiroshima and Nagasaki experiences, and where the case of Japan
is situated when considering the big picture. Of course, we should not underestimate the structural factors
and conditions that facilitated the process in the case of New Zealand, such as its small size and remote
island position in the Southwest Pacific, as well as a population of less than 2.5 million people in the
1960s. This made it easy to connect and synergistically interact with government representatives and
political elites. It is also a pluralistic and multi-cultural society, where the values of inclusion and a
commitment to peace and justice were fundamental in every sphere of the society.
However, their efforts toward de-nuclearization were based on somewhat hypothetical fear toward the
potential effects of nuclear weapons, whereas Japan’s effort has been based on rationalized and
legitimized fear3 after the catastrophic experiences in 1945 (and also the 2011 Fukushima nuclear power
plant accident). New Zealand has never experienced atomic bombing but always challenged the legality
of nuclear weapons use and even compiled complaints to the International Court of Justice [38].

3

Here, we intend to emphasize that Japan experienced atomic bombing, and the survivors have supported their
claims with its tragic impacts on their health, psychology, and emotions. Our intention for “hypothetical fear” is
related to how New Zealand perceived and interpreted a nuclear threat with its potential impacts.
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Furthermore, the overarching concern was not only the harmful effects of nuclear weapons on human
health and the environment, but also the threat between major powers during the Cold War era, leading to
increased antipathy toward nuclear weapons globally. Especially during the late phase of the Cold War,
from 1979-1985, the threat of nuclear war was elevated globally. Therefore, global anti–nuclear weapons
activism emerged and expanded4. At the same time, Japan, under American strategic planning and
protection throughout the Cold War, oriented national interests toward post-war economic reconstruction
and management, and thus played a passive role in foreign policy and global politics, especially in the
1980s [39].
Japan has maintained nuclear deterrence while emphasizing its efforts toward disarmament. Japan has a
very clear position, as briefly mentioned (i.e. the three principles of not possessing, producing, or
allowing the entry of nuclear weapons into the country), which is in line with New Zealand’s defense
policy. However, there is still something missing in the wider debate, which seems to be Japan’s vigorous
opposition and responsibility, which is needed to be put forward more in the policy debate. It is also
contradictory that the U.S. stored nuclear weapons on Okinawa, which hosted the largest and most active
U.S. Air Force base in East Asia during the Cold War [40]. For every country, the national security
context is different. Thus, we should not underestimate the complications that occurred when considering
the differences in political and historical contexts. New Zealand was not an aggressor in World War II,
while Japan was, and Japan has a long history of war with its neighbors, which has been influential in its
defense and foreign policies as well as disarmament diplomacy.
New Zealand’s nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament efforts have been reflected in the policy area by
passing the nuclear-free legislation in the 1980s. Since then, the nuclear-free policy has been supported in
the form of an ongoing civil society and governmental relationship, which is lacking in Japan5. Why is
New Zealand’s societal model and policy pattern important for us? As mentioned earlier, one of the
central contentions of this piece is that, in the case of New Zealand, the resources deployed and developed
by civil society actors from the end of World War II to the 1980s helped to achieve their policy goals
under favorable sociopolitical conditions. There is no doubt that it was germane to partisan politics,
reflected in elections. The New Zealand political system is a representative parliamentary democracy
whose western, liberal, and egalitarian values and ideologies have been proclaimed and embraced since
the end of the colonial era. These values now continue under any sociopolitical circumstances.
[41]
According to the Sustainable Governance Indicator, with fair and transparent electoral policies and a
strong rule of law, New Zealand, a liberal democracy with fully implemented and protected civil rights
and trustworthy institutions, receives a high overall ranking for the quality of its democracy [42]. New
Zealand has also been identified as one of the most peaceful countries in the world. According to the
Global Peace Index 2018 and 2019, it is ranked the world’s second most peaceful country [43]. Not
surprisingly, the nation played a strong role in the UN nuclear ban treaty negotiations in 2017. New
Zealand was one of the first states to ratify the TPNW.
Drivers of peace and nuclear-free mobilization in New Zealand are based on structural dynamism
including internal capacities and resources, successful strategic calculations, coherence and design in
4

It deserves a note here that the 1979 Three Mile Island accident in the U.S. and later 1986 Chernobyl Accident in
the SSRs led to the intensification of the fear of nuclear weapons production and proliferation.
5
One of my interviewees, who has been a prominent peace activist, Ms. Laurie Ross, stated it clearly:
The devastating effects of the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima/Nagasaki were more relevant in relation to New
Zealand people mobilizing the campaigns. The realization that a nuclear war could be over in a day, in which
millions of people would die instantly, millions more would die slowly and most of the planet would be
contaminated with radiation poisoning, motivated people with fear to prevent such an atrocity by marching in their
millions in street protests. However, it was to no avail. No amount of education about the horrors of Hiroshima is
sufficient to change political policies that support nuclear weapons “as defense/deterrence,” even in Japan [18, 41].
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timely actions, and rationalizing the nuclear-related risks and security challenges. The focus on the
catastrophic image of radioactivity and nuclear arms race during the Cold War era, and the attribution of a
moral value to the issue (such as on the civilian victims of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings), made
sense to the general public. The majority of New Zealanders seemed (at least in the 1970s and 1980s) to
understand the significance of their genuine role to be brave in the struggle to achieve the policy goal of a
nuclear-free nation. Additionally, the parallel between the disarmament campaigns and the Labor Party’s
nuclear-free stance popularized and facilitated the fight against nuclear weapons, which gained
recognition and eventually achieved legal status.
Politicians’ effective and constant communication with the electorate paved the way for the electorate to
access them regularly and at all times. Political sensitivity and value orientation resulted in active
participation in elections. Participation rates in elections, in general, rarely dropped below 90% of eligible
voters between the 1960s-1970s. Due to the national radio and television system and newspaper
readership, which is among the highest in the world, the whole country was immediately responsive and
reactive on local, national, and international issues [20].
A consistent collective engagement in the deliberative governance process and influencing the authorities
for the common good can be a useful tool to have a win-win outcome. The basis for a mainstreamed antinuclear struggle was not only the energetic participation of many anti-nuclear or anti-war critics voicing
their choices and opinions, but also a supportive party’s affirmative reactions, as we see with the Labor
Party in New Zealand’s case. Legislative change can take place in democracies when a communicative
approach (where citizens can easily access political elites) and collective persuasion on a contested issue
that threaten their status quo is utilized.
Political elites and policymakers can play a significant role in protecting and strengthening spaces for
citizens (the public sphere), which in return enables them to use their civic voices. This cannot be solely
related to New Zealand’s political history and government effectiveness, but also the way politicians
approach the nuclear weapons issue as part of the peace and security issue within the rationalized and
legitimized discourse. For New Zealanders, a general uniting factor was an unconditional opposition to
nuclear weapons and a clear target toward their enemy (also nuclear weapons).
In the case of Japan, civil society groups and media outlets condemned the government for being inactive
in the negotiations. Japan's failure to support the treaty has attracted criticism from numerous prodisarmament groups and atomic bomb survivors, which discredited the government’s long-standing antinuclear position. According to the recent survey conducted by the Chugoku Shimbun, 86% of hibakusha
groups want Japan to take part in the meetings of the state parties of TPNW [44]. And yet, the LDP's
policies are not reflective of public opinion on the disarmament issues and the support for global
disarmament initiatives6. Even though anti-nuclear sentiment still prevails over strategic considerations,
Japanese public opinion has not mobilized more actively for TPNW. It is also worth noting that recent
research carried out by Baron et al. (2020) shows that approximately 75% of the Japanese public is in
favor of signing and ratifying the TPNW [45]. We can assert that Japan’s government ignores the
majority’s voice. Importantly, the main participants of the 2017 UN negotiations for the TPNW were only
hibakusha and a handful of representatives of Japanese civil society organizations.
We see persistent public pressure and mobilization from civic actors in a limited and isolated manner in
Japan’s case. Nuclear-free forces with a peace orientation, including several spheres of society, have
6

For my doctoral research on environmental civil society mobilizing for energy policies in post-Fukushima Japan,
most of my respondents from civil society organizations stated that the governmental representatives from the LDP
continuously say, “I will take your opinions into consideration,” or “It is a very important issue, and we will take
care of it;” however, it does not lead to any substantial discussion or conclusion.
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mobilized and taken actions themselves for a nuclear-free world in general, and against nuclear-weapon
states in particular. Over the decades, organizational tools and resources (e.g. material and human
resources) supported mobilization on peace and nuclear-free advocacy, the motivation and determination
created by civil society actors, and the moral value added by pacifists and sensitive peacemakers.
However, it was not sufficient to create a national identity as a nuclear-free nation, as seen in New
Zealand. The Japanese government fails to provide more sustainable and morally-oriented defense
strategies due to its reliance on the U.S. due to security diplomacy between both countries, existing
nuclear threats from neighboring countries, and also isolated independent civic voices. Lessons for Japan
and other countries which can be taken from the case of New Zealand are as follows: perseverance,
consistency, and durability in policies; more communication and partnerships with civil society actors;
further engagement of civic voices in sociopolitical issues; and active leadership on the TPNW.
It is also worth noting that New Zealand is one of the few developed nations that is not supportive of
nuclear energy. According to New Zealand Trade and Enterprise (NZTE), New Zealand relies largely on
renewable alternatives in its energy portfolio, and it aims to achieve 100% renewable electricity by 2035
[46]. On the other hand, according to the 2018 Strategic Energy Plan, Japan’s nuclear energy target for
2030 is at 20-22%, which increases Japan’s reliance on nuclear energy [47]. This is contradictory to the
views of the general population, as there has been a big shift in public opinion against nuclear energy
following the 2011 Fukushima nuclear power plant accident.

VI. Conclusion
The opposition toward nuclear weaponry in New Zealand that started after World War II solidified the
links between the government and civil society, and continued advocacy led the nation to have a complete
nuclear ban in 1987 and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in 1996. The creation of New
Zealand’s identity as a nuclear-free nation was embraced and sustained over decades, and its global
nuclear-free commitments can be seen as an important benchmark in peace and nuclear-free history. It
proves what can be achieved when citizens unite and stand together for a nuclear-free nation. The
successfully formulated and implemented policy outcome is based on the assessment of what could be
done by civil society and what should be done by politicians.
For Japan, the dominant peace and nuclear-free discourses and activities are limited and are mainly
carried out in Hiroshima and Nagasaki by hibakusha and their family members, who pass on war
testimonies. That is to say, the anti-nuclear weapon lobby of Japan has limited power, which is mainly
invisible outside Hiroshima and Nagasaki. There are several reasons for this: the long-standing security
alliance with the U.S., the threats from nuclear-armed North Korea, and isolated civic mobilization.
Living in these times is in itself political, and excluding public preferences and demands for signing the
TPNW is critical. Despite widespread public support, Japan fails to take the lead in efforts by the national
and international community to realize a world free of nuclear weapons.
Overall, the refusal to participate in the treaty discredits Japan’s long-standing anti-nuclear position.
Japan needs a mature and progressive democracy in which civil society can enjoy free discussions,
including on nuclear weapons. We are aware that it may not be realistic for the time being; however,
Japan needs to be more independent in its foreign policy discussions. Further efforts are needed to
cultivate the democratic tools of civil society (social, educational, material, etc.) and political debates on
its commitments to the realization of a nuclear-free world in a more open, patient, longstanding, and
democratic manner. For this, New Zealand’s example offers valuable lessons for Japan and other
countries with its policy durability and legitimacy. This case tells us a historical story about the
relationships between sociopolitical movements, civil society, and democratic institutions, affecting the
visibility of peace and nuclear-free weapons campaigns in domestic and foreign policy agendas.
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